



欢迎. BIENVENUE. ДОБРО ПОЖАЛОВАТЬ. بڪ ل. WELCOME. BIENVENIDOS

Disarmament and International Security Committee

Aarav Chopra & Sagnik Banerjee
Chairs



DISEC

Letter from the Chair

Mithun Sethuraman
Secretary General

Cindy Long
Director General

Anish Konjeti
Under Secretary General of
General Assemblies

Ansh Shrivastava
Under Secretary General of
General Assemblies

Aasrith Jangala
Under Secretary General of
Specialized Agencies

Anusha Chakraborty
Under Secretary General of
Specialized Agencies

Yash Ganti
Under Secretary General of Crisis
Simulations

William Cale
Under Secretary General of Crisis
Simulations

Advaith Atulasimha
Director of Crisis

Saira Bhandari
Director of Crisis

Maneesh Marikannan
Director of Technology

Anisha Mandal
Director of Charitable Givings

Arshia Ajai
Director of Press and Publications

Ms. Laurie Morris
Conference Sponsor

Hello Honorable Delegates,

Welcome to the 14th Iteration of Moody's Model United Nations Conference! We are so excited to be your chairs for the DISEC committee, and we look forward to meeting all of you at our conference. Your chairs for the DISEC committee are Aarav Chopra and Sagnik Banerjee. Aarav Chopra is a 7th grader in Moody Middle School and has won 4 awards in 6th grade. Outside of school, he likes to play cricket and read. Sagnik Banerjee is an 8th grader at Moody Middle School who has 2 years of experience. Outside of Model UN, he participates in many activities like Debate and Tennis.

In this committee, you will be tackling global challenges, such as how the ethics in major weapons exports are linked to civilian deaths and the Defense Industry Competition's security threats. You and your fellow delegates are going to be tasked with finding a solution to end these conflicts, in regard to each country's values and needs. In DISEC, you can look forward to new peace corporations being established and conflicts involving warring countries. The first topic for the Disarmament and International Security Committee is the Ethical Responsibility in Global Arms Exports. This topic will discuss the global arms trade and its correspondence to the Human Rights Act. The second topic will talk about the Security Risks of Defense Industry Competition. In this topic, delegates will be expected to shed light on how terrorist groups create major issues within a region by acquiring dangerous weapons. Throughout discussions of these topics, you and your fellow delegates will be expected to discover possible solutions to these pressing issues.

On a different note, please wear proper Western Business Attire and print out any needed materials before committee sessions. Additionally, position papers are required if you want to win awards, and the usage of Artificial Intelligence in writing a position paper will automatically disqualify you from any awards. Please send your position paper before the committee session one starts to both of our emails found below, and please give us editing/commenting rights to your paper. If awards are your biggest concern, please note that if you talk clearly, work fairly with fellow delegates, and are considerate of others around you, then you will be a priority for awards. Please contact us for questions or concerns at hcps-chopra1@henricostudents.org or hcps-banerjees@henricostudents.org. We look forward to meeting all delegates in April, and thank you all for participating in Moody MUN!

Sincerely,

Aarav Chopra & Sagnik Banerjee

MMSMUN XIV

George H. Moody Middle School Model United Nations

DISEC

Topic 1: Ethical Responsibility in Global Arms Exports
Topic 2: The Security Risks of Defence Industry Competition

Committee Overview

The Disarmament and International Security Committee is often regarded as the driving force behind many decisions on warfare. DISEC is mainly focused on the issues of global weapons trading, one of the world's biggest industries. Established in 1945 at the start of the UN, this General Assembly has been devoted to addressing global issues through the proper use of arms, such as attempting to intercept arms shipments to terrorist groups. This is crucial to the success of many other operations executed throughout history, like Operation

Sandstorm(Iran) and Operation Stabilization(Afghanistan).

The DISEC Committee faces various issues, such as the Regulation of Emerging Technology, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Digital Sovereignty, and Hybrid Warfare. These problems highlight key issues in the fundamental foundation of this committee. The emerging threat of AI weapons and missiles creates an atmosphere of distrust, as any nation may launch a deadly attack on another, leading to a world full of warfare and careful surveillance. This type of behavior between countries has been seen before, though. In World War II,

Nazi-occupied Germany was known to be making an atomic weapon, leading to the hurried preparation of defense by many other countries. The U.S. hastily started its Manhattan Project, causing nations to believe that the United States was betraying the Allied Side and joining the Nazis. The British also finished developing their Trident II Missiles, forging nothing but distrust between the nations.

As wars have broken out in recent times, a deadlier version of the “atomic race” in World War II is playing out, however, this time with advanced submarines and anti-air missiles. As the world was nearly torn apart by WW2, the possibilities of what horrors may befall the world if this happens push DISEC to avidly attempt to secure peace in the world. As this committee inches closer to collapse, delegates must address issues such as funding and ethical responsibilities. Many plans devised by this committee could not

be carried out because DISEC urgently needed to aid countries under siege by terrorist groups. Another problem that must be solved is corruption, which is the major cause of disputes between countries. This not only causes millions of cartels full of drugs to be smuggled into countries, but also creates tension between bordering nations, which eventually evolves into wars.

Although governments are heavily strained during conflicts, the main burden falls on the citizens, who may or may not have anything to do with the conflict. Citizens flee their hometowns, hoping to escape the violence and bloodshed, only to find themselves in a camp with little to no funding. This adds strain to this committee, as funding is already low. Delegates must also create a solution for what to do with the millions of people stuck in refugee camps, unable to leave for fear that they might be killed. All in all, DISEC works to help underdeveloped countries, aid citizens stuck in refugee

camps, and solve conflicts between countries.

TOPIC I: Ethical Responsibility in Global

Arms Exports

Background

In recent years, the impact of global arms exports has become more visible and more troubling. Most of these transfers are driven by major military powers such as the United States and Russia, but weapons also move through regional partners and allies. In the Middle East, for example, internationally recognized monarchies like Saudi Arabia have supplied arms that later surfaced in conflicts involving both state forces and non-state actors. The presence of numerous armed and extremist groups in the region makes the situation even more volatile. The Houthis, for instance, have drawn international attention by targeting shipping in the Red Sea, claiming to act in support of groups like Hamas and framing their actions as part of a wider struggle that includes the

war in Ukraine and tensions with Israel.

These attacks show that the conflict in Yemen and the weapons that fuel it have consequences far beyond the country's borders.

This broader pattern makes it much harder to ensure that arms exports are handled responsibly. When rival states or armed groups attack shipping lanes and bomb vessels carrying weapons, the flow of arms becomes unpredictable and dangerous to manage. The Suez Canal in Egypt is a clear example of what is at stake: it is one of the world's most important trade routes and a vital shortcut between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. If cargo ships cannot safely pass through it, they must sail around the Cape of Good Hope at Africa's southern tip to avoid possible danger. These additional hindrances cost a significant amount on shipping charges, as many barges have to take an extra journey of 19,800 kilometers, which can add an extra 20 to 30 days to a

trip. On the other hand, taking the Suez Canal can take only up to 10-14 days, depending on the vessel speed and sea conditions during the voyage. This may not seem much at a small scale, but in the large scheme of global shipping, it is a major issue, with the economy losing millions of dollars every day.

In many of the attacks on maritime routes, no group publicly takes responsibility, which deepens uncertainty and mistrust. These deceptive attackers hide in the shadows, taking down innocent ships, which wastes precious time and resources. As militaries lose equipment supplies and are forced to cut off supply routes, people on the ground, especially civilians caught in conflict zones, often pay the highest price. Facing prolonged violence and a lack of reliable protection or aid, they are vulnerable and can have anything done to them. As a result of these tragedies, human rights and morale are being put into question

by investigators as everyday civilians are being impacted by the crimes of others. Global statistics suggest 300,000 to 500,000 fatalities by small arms, containing deaths from both conflict zones and high-violence communities (Global Issues, 2006). Over 90% of these deaths are estimated to be civilian deaths, showing how abusive war can be mixed in with the dangers of arms export.

Additionally, the few permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, including the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, China, France, and Germany, are responsible for roughly 80% of conventional arms in the global circulation of weapons. The profit these nations gain often blinds them from the ethical responsibility they withhold in doing background checks and lending weapons to trustworthy sources. Similarly, the question of whether ethics outweighs the global economic and security interests arises when

civilians are harmed every day due to the lack of military groups. These inquiries are made by nations that are at war, where countries need arms for security reasons and protection. However, other sides of the argument state that human lives are lost every day from wars, which are fueled by weapons exports that enable widespread conflict.

Current Status

In recent times, this crisis has been characterized by the rising insecurities of geopolitics and the human rights obligations of everyday civilians. Despite past attempts at resolving these issues, with the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), global arms trading is slowly increasing. As arms exports rise, they fuel human rights abuses by violent groups and aid in violating international humanitarian law in conflict zones. For example, the “Arms for Gaza” crisis is currently being fueled by several nations that are continuing to supply weapons to

Israel despite the allegations of war crimes they face, with the United States and Germany being the primary suppliers. Moreover, human rights groups and legal experts are standing up by suing governments to stop arms shipments, with their main point of argument being the violation of international law. This is a key example of how arms export can affect people in wars, since transferring weapons to each nation will further enable them to keep fighting.

Additionally, world powers, including the United States and numerous European Union members, have established new ideals and created new legislation for controversial actions. For example, the Trump Administration of the U.S. has revoked a Biden-era Order regarding linking arms sales to human rights compliance, including the National Security Memorandum-20, which made it mandatory to provide assurances that U.S. weapons

were not used to violate international law. Furthermore, the United States government has pushed to move towards more weapon sales with a transition from slower, safer government-to-government transactions to a faster, unmonitored direct commercial sales channel. These changes have made clear the U.S. government's oversight of the true danger of arms export and its shifting policies on these issues.

However, the United States is not the only nation following this trend, as multiple countries within the European Commission have proposed a "Defense Readiness Omnibus" that critics have analyzed will weaken the European Union's Transfers Directive and further reduce the EU's control on arms exports within the region. These ideas, if put to fruition, will create a devastating impact on how controlled the organization is when it comes to arms exports. Moreover, some European nations have suspended their sales to Saudi Arabia

over Yemen, but other countries have continued supplying arms, which highlights a weakness in their unanimity and compliance. These patches of resistance within the organization can lead to an escalation of conflict and further endanger people in other conflict zones, like Saudi Arabia.

Overall, every region of the world is facing this problem differently in legislation and exportation. These changes have made significant impacts both positively and negatively on this issue while raising others, but it has become a global understanding of how crucial solving this problem is. Clearly, the current status of global arms export is not in the best place, so it is incumbent upon the delegates to utilize this information in creating solutions and voicing the concerns of others to ensure the well-being of all.

Analysis/Possible Solutions

Looking ahead to 2026, global arms exports are likely to keep reflecting a tense

balance between profit and principle. Defense companies fight fiercely for contracts, and once a sale is closed, there is often little incentive to ensure the safe use of sold arms. In that environment, ethical responsibility for defense dealers to ensure the safety of people around the world can easily be pushed aside in favor of industrial gains. Moreover, when sophisticated systems are moved into repressive environments, both the manufacturer and the exporting state should remain tied, morally and politically, to any abuses or humanitarian crises that follow. However, these terms are not being met to their full potential; many alliances and treaties, including the Arms Trade Treaty, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, the United Nations Programme of Action on Small, and regional bodies such as the European Council, have not acted fully upon this issue.

Answering the numerous questions in unknown territory, such as the effectiveness of governments' monitoring of arms sales, the responsibility defense companies hold when making sales, and how United Nations charters mitigate global arms export issues, is all tied together within the process of solving this global problem. These questions of accountability are at the heart of current debates on international law and technology governance. Without clear ethical standards and strong, enforceable export controls for AI-enabled systems, there is a real danger that highly advanced, opaque, lethal tools will end up in places with weak governance and poor human rights records. In that scenario, the damage is not limited to individual incidents, as it can undermine trust in international norms and further destabilize an already fragile global security environment.

This is why it is upon the delegates to utilize international alliances and laws to

ensure the safety and security of humans globally. Furthermore, uplifting technological systems such as AI-enabled software can decrease the amount of errors made in export control. However, delegates will also have to investigate the governance problems in less developed areas, which may not be familiar with sophisticated monitoring systems. Now, it is up to the delegates to answer the questions below, to uphold their morality, and engineer solutions to ensure the safety of people around the world and a decrease in the harm caused by the sales of arms.

Questions to Consider

1. How is decision-making authority over international arms sales typically distributed among legislative bodies, defense ministries, and private defense contractors within exporting states?
2. To what extent do arms-exporting countries weigh immediate economic

or strategic benefits against potential long-term impacts on regional stability in recipient areas experiencing conflict?

3. How do arms-exporting governments reconcile stated commitments to human rights with continued weapons transfers to partners facing international scrutiny for their conduct in armed conflicts?
4. When advanced military technologies, such as unmanned systems or precision-guided munitions, are transferred internationally, what safeguards are commonly implemented to prevent misuse, proliferation, or reverse engineering?
5. What role do global weapons manufacturers play in shaping arms export policies, particularly in cases where there is documented civilian harm in ongoing conflict zones?

6. To what extent do global weapons manufacturers influence approvals for exporting arms despite proven civilian harm in conflict zones such as Gaza and Ukraine, for monetary profits?

TOPIC 2: The Security Risks of Defense

Industry Competition

Background

Nearly 2.5 trillion U.S dollars are spent globally on advancing different styles of warfare. However, by 2026, many of the most serious risks are playing out in less obvious places, hidden deep inside the systems and supply chains that keep the global arms trade running. These are the nuances, such as the illegal trade of fake guns, which need to be investigated to solve the root of this problem.

However, to stay competitive and keep revenue flowing, big defense companies rely on huge networks of smaller subcontractors. These changes might make

business cheaper and faster, but it also opens up a whole new world of security issues. It's much more accessible for a hacker to breach a small parts supplier like the popular General Dynamics that uses weak passwords than to get through the harsh security of a government facility. As a result, many hackers are targeting the weak corporations that supply shipments of weapons and ammunition to military groups around the world, instead of finding governments, as it's less effort and more gain.

At the same time, the race to dominate AI has turned into a "wild west" of technology. Since companies feel constant pressure as others around them add AI to everything, which makes them feel obliged to follow, but they overlook the risk of having the same technology turned against them. Since 2025, competitors have been using AI tools to investigate flaws in weapon designs or even steal digital blueprints, allowing them to produce fake or

upgraded versions of advanced weapons. This is a major concern for global safety, since a country can spend numerous years and billions of dollars developing a secret military technology, only to discover that a rival has quietly copied and improved it by slightly modifying the design to cover for the flaws during development

The more pressing concern of today is how concentrated the defense industry has become. After years of mergers and buyouts, only a few giant companies dominate this sector of the global economy. These firms are effectively “too big to fail,” with numerous contacts throughout the government, which prevents their risk of being thrown out of the market, since they control the market illegally. This lack of diversity in companies is a major risk globally since it could affect people worldwide. If even one of these companies suffers a major cyberattack, production failure, or long delay, there may be no

backup supplier to step in. The whole world has sacrificed resilience in favor of efficiency. In response, many militaries are now trying to bring in smaller, more agile tech startups to break this near-monopoly. The hope is to build a defense ecosystem that is more like a diverse forest full of different, adaptable players, rather than a fragile puzzle made of just a few critical pieces.

Moreover, this system can fall apart even faster since foreign governments or criminal groups with ill intentions can gain access to smaller subcontractors by breaching their weak security systems. Since most large arms suppliers receive their parts from these companies, it directly connects these subcontractors to millions of dollars tied up in ammunition.

Current Status

The traditional security border is often broken through the weak spots in the supply chain, specifically, smaller

subcontractors. While a big company might have strong digital locks and background checks, the smaller shops that provide specific parts often do not have the money for the same level of defense. Attackers use these weaker links to put "Trojan horse" parts or hidden computer bugs, such as sending a "confidential email that contains a malicious link into the building process. For instance, when a part gets to the final factory, the problem is built right into the machine. This makes it almost impossible to find the issue without breaking the part open or using expensive tests.

Using Artificial Intelligence on the factory floor has created a new risk where digital versions of machines can be used against a company. AI spying tools can now listen to a factory's sounds, watch its power use, or check its heat to figure out secret building methods from the outside. AI drones are an example of this. Also, if an AI controller is hacked by a hacker attempting

to inject malware into the servers of a factory, it can secretly change how parts are made. This can cause parts to fail on purpose or allow secrets to be stolen while the digital records look perfectly normal. These issues create a hidden problem that works much faster than any human can track.

The push to save money has led to a situation where the world's supply of important parts, like computer chips or special chemicals, is stuck in just a few locations. While this makes things cheaper to produce, it creates a fragile system. A single event, like a war or a natural disaster in one small area, can stop factories all over the world. This weakness means that an enemy does not need to destroy an entire industry. They only need to stop one or two of these main supply points to gain control over the whole system.

Analysis/Possible Solutions

Several promising strategies have been suggested to effectively tackle these complex challenges. They include strengthening international guidelines and cooperation by revising and updating existing global norms and frameworks through new or amended agreements, establishing clearer standards, and implementing stronger enforcement. At the same time, better coordination is crucial among nations, international organizations (like the United Nations and regional bodies), non-governmental organizations, and other important stakeholders to improve consistency and effectiveness in implementation. It is equally important to increase transparency and independent oversight through mandatory reporting, regular independent audits, appropriate public disclosure of relevant information (as long as it does not conflict with operational needs), and the creation or strengthening of dedicated, credible monitoring entities.

These actions build trust, reduce the risk of misuse, and ensure timely accountability.

A third important factor is finding a balance between security needs and humanitarian priorities. This means reconciling legitimate national and collective security goals, including counterterrorism, arms control, and responses to new threats, with the urgent need to uphold humanitarian principles. Security policies should not hinder impartial humanitarian access, block the delivery of life-saving aid to civilians, or violate fundamental principles of international human-rights law. To support this balance, mechanisms such as thorough harm assessments, public interest evaluations, and robust safeguards should be incorporated to prioritize human rights and protect vulnerable groups. Together, these three connected pillars (strengthened norms and cooperation, improved accountability and transparency, and a balanced approach to

security and humanitarian needs) are essential for sustainable and fair solutions to these issues, as recognized by experts and policymakers.

Questions to Consider

1. How should defence organizations identify, evaluate, and adapt to emerging security risks as technologies, threat actors, and operational environments continue to evolve?
2. In what ways do vulnerabilities within global and multi-tier supply chains affect the security, reliability, and integrity of defence systems and information?
3. How should defence organizations balance the management of cyber,

physical, and insider threats, and what challenges arise when integrating these risk domains into a single security strategy?

4. How should national and international regulatory frameworks influence security risk assessment, compliance priorities, and operational decision-making within the defence industry?
5. What approaches can be used to measure the likelihood and potential impact of security risks in defence programmes, and how do these assessments inform investment, mitigation, and governance decisions?

WORKS CITED

United Nations. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. United Nations, 1945.

United Nations General Assembly. Draft Provisional Programme of Work and Timetable of the First Committee for 2024. A/C.1/78/CRP.4, 2023. United Nations Digital Library, digitallibrary.un.org/record/4025110.

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook 2023. Vol. 48, United Nations, 2024.

United Nations General Assembly. Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 22 December 2023: Part IV of the Report of the First Committee. A/RES/78/241, 2024.

Hitchens, Theresa. "Director Statement to the United Nations General Assembly First Committee." United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 21 Oct. 2011, New York.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 729, no. 10485, 1968.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. United Nations, 10 Sept. 1996.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. United Nations, 10 Apr. 1972.

Acheson, Ray, and Emma Bjertén, editors. First Committee Briefing Book 2023. Reaching Critical Will, 2023, www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/publications-and-research/publications/17038-first-committee-briefing-book-2023.

Borrie, John. The Disarmament Machinery: A Guide to Institutions and Processes. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2020.

"First Committee of the UN General Assembly." Reaching Critical Will, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 2024, www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/unga.

Pytlak, Allison. The First Committee Monitor. Vol. 21, no. 1, Reaching Critical Will, Oct. 2023.

Small Arms and Light Weapons: Update #1. International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), 2025, iansa.org/united-nations-general-assembly-first-committee-2025/.

Storsve, Alison. "80th Session of the United Nations General Assembly: First Committee - Cluster 5 – Other Disarmament Issues and International Security." U.S. Mission to International

Organizations in Geneva, 6 Nov. 2025,

geneva.usmission.gov/2025/11/06/80th-session-of-the-united-nations-general-assembly-first-committee-cluster-5/.

Cooper, Neil. "The Arms Trade and International Security." *The Oxford Handbook of International Security*, edited by Alexandra Gheciu and William C. Wohlforth, Oxford UP, 2018, pp. 435-450.